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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent

v.
RONALD DALE EASTHOPE,

Case No. 18310

Defendant-Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction for Aggravated Sexual
Assault, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-405 (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Dean E. Conder, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Ronald Dale Easthope, was charged by Information
with Aggravated Sexual Assault, a First Degree Felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-405 (1953 as amended).

On February

8, 1982, the appellant was convicted by a jury as charged, and
on February 17, 1982, was sentenced to incarceration in the
Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of five years to
life.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant, Ronald Dale Easthope, seeks reversal of
the judgment entered against him and a new trial in the court
below.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the early morning hours of September 19, 1981, in
a basement apartment at 1010 Downington Street, Salt Lake City,

•

Utah, Hazel Jensen was raped at knifepoint by a person she described
as wearing a pillow case mask, a levi jacket, white tennis shoes
with blue stripes, and red and white gloves.
44, 48-49)

(T. 39-40, 43-

Ms. Jensen never saw her assailant's face and was

consequently unable to directly identify anyone as the rapist,
but did give a description which generally matched the appellant's
size and build.

(T. 46-47)

After the appellant's arrest, the State filed a motion
in the Fifth Circuit Court requesting hair samples and body
fluids from the appellant.

(T. Dece 4, p. 3)

The motion was

granted, allowing hair samples and blood to be taken from the
appellant, which were later used at trial against the appellant
over defense counsel's objections.

(T. 324-25)

Before the trial, defense counsel made a motion to sequester
the jury, in order to prevent exposure of the jury to possible
media coverage of the trial.

(TD 3)

This motion was renewed

during the trial after counsel had observed news reports of
the case which highlighted and drew attention to the court's
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gag order, on the grounds that anyone viewing or hearing of
the news reoorts would at least wonder what the appellant had
to hide.

Defense counsel also moved the court to ask the jurors

individually if any of them had seen or heard news reports of
publicity of the case.

Both motions were denied.

(T. 120-

21)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN PERMITTING
THE BLOOD AND HAIR SAMPLES TAKEN FROM THE APPELLANT
TO BE USED IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.
While the appellant was in custody and under arrest,
but before the preliminary hearing and before the appellant
had been bound over for trial, the State filed its motion
to compel discovery in the Fifth Circuit Court.

The motion

was granted by that court over defense counsel's objection,
oursuant to which the samµles of blood and hair were taken.
However, the Fifth Circuit Court exceeded the scope of
its authority in granting a discovery motion in this instance.
This conclusion follows from the holding of this Court in Van
1
Dam v. Morris, 571, P.2d 1325 (Utah 1977), and that court's
analysis of the statutory scheme.

Although both the Code of

Criminal Procedure and the Court system in Utah have been revised

1. All statutory references are to Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended), unless otherwise stated.
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since the Van Dam decision, both the pertinent language of the
new Code provisions and the new court structure are in all material
respects the same as the analogous provisions discussed in Van
Dam .
In Van Dam, this Court held that a city court judge (analogous
to today's circuit court judge) presiding at a preliminary hearing
on a felony case "does not sit as a judge of a court and exercises
none of the powers of a judge in a court proceeding, except
2
as they inhere in the office of magistrate"
The court then
pointed out that a magistrate derives his power entirely from
statute, and that the power conferred upon a magistrate conducting
a preliminary hearing by the then existing statutes was "limited
to discharging the defendant (77-15-17) or holding him for proceedings
in the district court (77-15-19)." 3 The court then concluded
that the powers granted to "the court" to dismiss an action
(by then sections 77-51-1 through 4) were not held by a city
judge while acting as a magistrate conducting a preliminary
hearing, although the same judge did have the power to dismiss
if sitting as a trial judge.

2.

571 P.2d at 1327

3.

Id.

-4-
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The present statutory scheme, which created the circuit
courts in place of the old city courts, retains essentially
the same procedural structure.

Section 78-4-5 grants to the

judge of the circuit court "the powers and jurisdiction of a
magistrate, including proceedings for the preliminary examination
to determine probable cause. .

"

Rule 7(d) of the Utah Rules

of Criminal Procedure expounds upon the powers of the magistrate
in conducting the preliminary hearing, giving him the power
to bind over a defendant to district court upon a finding of
probable cause.

Rule 7(d)(l) then specifically provides that:

"Objections to evidence on the ground that it was acquired by
unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary examination."
Thus, the magistrate is statutorily denied the power to decide
questions of the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence,
on either constitutional or statutory grounds.
Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure deals with
discovery in criminal cases.

Throughout the entire provision

various grants of power are made to "the court" to decide which
items shall be discoverable.

Subsection (g) gives to "the court"

the power to impose sanctions for the failure to comply with
the rule.

Nowhere in the rule is a magistrate given any power

concerning discovery.

The fair import of the language of Rule

16 evidence a legislative intent that the discovery process
be under the direction of "the court" having jurisdiction to
try the case, and not the magistrate who merely conducts the
probable cause hearing.

This intent is particularly highlighted
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by the specific prohibition of Rule 7(d) mentioned above, which,
when coupled with the provision allowing hearsay evidence at
preliminary hearings, evidences a legislative intent to avoid
potentially unnecessary disputes over the admissibility of evidence
before it has ever been determined whether or not the trial
itself is necessary.
This analysis is identical to that used by the Van Dam
court.

If the magistrate conducting the preliminary hearing

has no power to dismiss the case because the powers of the magistrate
exist only as created by statute, and the statute gives the
power to dismiss only to "the court", the same reasoning should
apply to the power to compel discovery; since the statute only
gives that power to "the court", the magistrate simply has no
power to compel discovery.
Indeed, this was the conclusion reached by Judge Dean
E. Conder of the Third District Court in his Memorandum Decision
in Cannon v. Keller, Miscellaneous No. M-80-88 (December 15,
1980), where he faced precisely the issue now under discussion.
Granting the oetitioner's Writ of Mandamus directing the circuit
court judge to declare null and void his previous order compelling
discovery, Judge Conder reasoned that the jurisdiction of a
circuit court judge conducting a preliminary hearing for a felony
case is limited to that of a magistrate.

Since, at connnon law,

no right to discovery existed, any such right must necessarily
arise by statute or constitution.

The constitution being silent,

and the statute failing to grant power to a magistrate to compel
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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discovery, the circuit court was held to lack jurisdiction to
issue the order of discovery in that case.
The same result should follow in the present case.

The

appellant was unlawfully compelled to submit to the sampling
of his blood and hair, and the evidence obtained therefrom is
inadmissible.

The use of inadmissible evidence denied the appellant

his right to a fair trial and due process of law, was prejudicial
because of the damning nature of the tests performed on those
samples, and requires a reversal of the conviction rendered
below.
POINT A
THE TAKING OF THE APPELLANT'S BLOOD SAMPLE WAS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
Should this court agree that the circuit court was without
jurisdiction to issue the motion compelling discovery in this
case, then the hair and blood samples taken from the appellant
were obtained without a valid search warrant, since no warrant
was issued in the present case.

And while the taking of the

appellant's hair sample may have constituted such a slight intrusion
into the body of the appellant that it was constitutionally
permissible even absent a search warrant, 4 the same cannot

4.

See State v. Mccumber, 622 P.2d 353, 358 (Utah 1980)
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be said of the blood sample.

This was made clear by the United

States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed. 2d 908 (1966).
Schmerber was an appeal from a conviction for driving
an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
The defendant was arrested at the hospital where he was being
treated for injuries sustained in an accident.

Against his

will a blood sample was taken at that time and later introduced
at trial as evidence of the defendant's intoxication.
On appeal it was argued that admission of this evidence
violated several of the defendant's constitutional rights.

Although

his conviction was upheld, the Supreme Court decided clearly
for the first time that the law of search and seizure applies
to body examinations for physical evidence.

Most significantly,

the court held that no physical evidence could be seized unless
investigators first obtained a warrant or the facts of the situation
justified a warrantless search under one of the traditional
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
The Court noted that, although this search of the defendant's
body was conducted after his arrest, that fact alone could not
purify a warrantless intrusion into his body.

Whatever justification

exists for a search pursuant to arrest do not apply to this
sort of body search, the court added.

384 U.S. at 772.

The court held that because the evidence of alcohol in
the arrested person's blood was diminishing and would soon be
eliminted altogether, its seizure fell under the traditional
exception to the warrant requirement in emergency situations.
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However, the court made clear that its holding was not to be
interpreted too broadly:
It bears repeating, however, that we reach this
judgment only on the facts of the present record.
The integrity of an individual's constitution does
not forbid the States minor intrusions into an
individual's body under stringently limited conditions
in no way indicates that it permits more substantial
intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.
Id.
The United States Supreme Court reiterated this principal
in the subsequent case of Cupp v. Murphey, 412 U.S. 291, 93
S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed. 2d 900 (1973).

In that case the defendant

appeled from his conviction of the murder of his wife on the
grounds that scrapings from under his fingernails were improperly
seized and used as evidence against him.
In Cupp the defendant voluntarily appeared at the station
house for questioning about his wife's murder.

Investigators

interrogating him noticed a dark spot under ·one of his fingernails,
and realizing its potential relevance to the victim's death

by strangulation, sought to examine the defendant's hands.

When

asked about the dark spots, he began to scrape at them himself,
and at this time the defendant was subjected to a forcible examination
of his nails.

Thread from the victim's night gown and blood

her type were found.
The Supreme Court held that this search was not unreasonable
despite the fact that the defendant had not been arrested or
served with a warrant.

The court's decision was based upon

the emergency situation which existed where relevant evidence
was about to be destroyed:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"The rationale of Chimel, in the circumstances,
justified the policy in subjecting him to the very
limited search necessary to preserve the highly
evanescent evidence they found under his fingernails."
(Em?hasis Supplied). 412 U.S. at 296
In the instant case the defendant did not consent to
the search of his body and the seizure of blood and hair samples.
No emergency existed which justified this search without a warrant;
there was no possibility of the evidence sought being destroyed
through natural processes or by the defendant himself.

Under

Schrnerber the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated
and his blood samples were improperly admitted into evidence.
These standards are clearly applicable in State court
proceedings as illustrated by the recent California case of
People v. Bracamonte, 15 Cal. 3d 394, 540 Po2d 624 (1975).

The

defendant was suspected of having swallowed several balloons
of heroin to avoid their discovery when searched by police.
She was forcibly administered an emitic which caused her to
vomit and give up the balloons of heroin as expected.
Although the defendant was searched pursuant to a warrant
which authorized examination of her person and effects, the
California Court held that its coverage did not extend to physical
evidence.

And since no emergency existed which justified a

warrantless search of her body, the evidence was held to have
been improperly seized.
The Colorado Court has applied Schmerber in the same
manner holding the withdrawal of a blood sample against the
defendant's will was authorized only because of the emergency
exception to the warrant requirement.

People v. Smith, 175
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Colo. 212, 486 P.2d 8 (1971).

See also People v. Sanchez, 476

P.2d 908 (Colo. 1970).
The seizure of the appellant's blood in the present case
for mere type testing could have and should have been carried
out pursuant to a warrant.

The failure to do so resulted in

a search and seizure violative of the appellant's Fourth Amendment
rights.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL.ERROR IN REFUSING
TO POLL THE JURORS AS TO THEIR POSSIBLE EXPOSURE TO
PUBLICITY OF THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS, AND IN REFUSING TO
SEQUESTER THE JURY.
In 1971, the appellant was charged with a series of sexual
assaults which occurred in the Sugarhouse area of Salt Lake
City.

The appellant was convicted on two counts of rape at

that time and sentenced to prison.

The 1971 trial was surrounded

by considerable publicity, and the appellant was labeled by
the press as the "sugarhouse rapist".

(T. 2-5)

Shortly after

his parole in 1981, the appellant was charged with the aggravated
sexual assault of which he now stands convicted.

Surrounding

the arrest and the preliminary hearing of this case was a fair
amount of press coverage referring to the appellant as the "sugarhouse
rapist".

Typical headlines were, "Rapist charged again", and

"Paroled 'Sugarhouse Rapist' Charged with Sexual Assault."
It was this kind of publicity which caused defense counsel
initially to make a motion to have the jury sequestered.
91-92)

(T.

Since there were no media personnel in the courtroom

at the beginning of the trial the motion was denied, with leave
to reopen the motion if the situation should change.

(T. 3)
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By the second morning of trial, the situatipn had changed:
Representatives of the media had arrived; the court had instructed
the media not to refer to the appellant as the "Sugarhouse Rapist"
or to refer to his prior criminal record (T. 91-92); and both
the 6:00 o'clock and the 10:00 o'clock T.V. news on Channel
2 had reported the progress of the trial.

Both of those news

reports had followed the judge's order, but had stated that
the appellant was charged with a rape and that an order was
entered which prohibited them from reporting certain things
about the apµellant that were already of public record.
120-21).

(Te

At this point, defense counsel renewed the motion

to sequester the jury, and further moved to poll the jurors
individually as to whether or not they had been exposed to any
media coverage.

The judge denied both motions, choosing instead

to rely on his admonitions to the jury not to see, hear, or
read media reports.

(T. 120-21).

The right to a fair trial by an impartial jury is protected
by both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.
State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 237 P. 941 (1925).

This means

that the accused has the right to a trial by a jury "free from
outside influences", and that the verdict must be based on evidence
presented at trial, and not upon evidence from other sources,
such as the media.

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362,

86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed. 2d 600 (1966).
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With respect to the influence of publicity on the trial
of an accused, two rules have been developed by the federal
courts.

The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in State v. Keliiholokai,

569 P.2d 891 (Ha. 1977), gives an excellent analysis and summary
of the case law developing these two rules.

The appellant urges

this Court to adopt the federal court analysis outlined below.
First, whe·re extensive media reporting highly prejudicial to
the accused comes to the attention of the jurors during the
trial, a· clear denial of the right to a fair trial by an impartial
jury has occurred, and the conviction will be reversed.

Estes

v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed. 2d 543 (1965).
In Estes, the confusion, distraction, and intensity of public
feeling and pressure caused by live T.V. coverage of the proceedings
were held to have denied the defendant of his right to a fair
trial by an impartial jury, because of the inherent possibility
of prejudice.
The second rule, relevant to the instant case, is applicable
where the potential of prejudice is not obvious or inherent,
and where the extent of the jury's exposure to the media reports
is uncertain.

In such an instance, where the trial court has

been made aware of the media reports, that court must then determine
"the extent and effect of the infection, and . . . take appropriate
measures to assure a fair trial."

United States v. Jones,

542

F.2d 186, 194 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Pomponie, 517
F.2d 460, 463 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. den. 423 U.S. 1015, 96
S.Ct. 448, 46 L.Ed. 2d 386 (1975).
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This requires a two-step approach.

The trial court must

first determine whether or not "the nature of the news accounts
rises to the level of being substantially prejudicial."
569 P.2d at 895.

Keliiholokai,

If the news accounts are not substantially

prejudicial, the inquiry is at an end and the court need do
nothing further.

Jones, 542 F.2d at 1940

If substantial prejudice

is found, however, the· court must examine each juror.
Individually and outside the presence of other
jurors to determine the effect of the publicitye
However, if no juror indicates, upon inquiry made
to the jury collectively that he has read or heard
any of the publicity in question the judge is not
required to proceed further. Margoles v. United
States, 407 F.2d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
den. 396 U.S. 833, 90 S.Ct. 89, 24 L.Ed. 2d 84
(1969); United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 194
(4th Cir. 1976).
If the trial court fails to make at least an initial
inquiry (where media reports are prejudicial) , the accused is
thereby denied the opportunity to find out whether or not the
jurors have been exposed to the reports -- i.e., whether or
not the jurors are indeed free from outside influence.

Such

a failure constitutes reversible error, since the trial court's
conduct in such an instance, even where the jurors have been
instructed not to see, hear, or read media reports, is not a
sufficient protection of the accused's right to a fair trial.
Pomponio, 517 F.2d at 460.
Turning to the facts of the present case, on the second
day of trial the judge expressly refused to ask the jurors,
either collectively or individually, whether or not they had
seen or heard any news reports from the night before.
so, he stated, "I heard the news report.

I don't think that
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In doing

that was ?rejudicial".

(T. 121)

If this court chooses to adopt

the federal analysis, the issue then becomes one of whether
or not the trial court's "finding" of no prejudice in the news
reports was proper.

.

If that finding was proper, the court was

correct in not inquiring further.

If not, the court's failure

to poll the jurors as to their possible exposure to the report
failed to assure the appellant of a fair trial, and requires
reversal.
As stated above, the appellant's trial and conviction
some ten years ago were highly publicized, and the label, "Sugarhouse
Rapist", given him by the press, was connnonly known.

Indeed,

the members of this Court themselves were probably familiar
with the "Sugarhouse Rapist" even independent of any possible
judicial connection with the case.

And at the appellant's arrest

and preliminary hearing, the media emphatically told the public
that the "Sugarhouse Rapist" was again being tried for rape.
However, the appellant was not generally known by his real name,
which probably accounts for the fact that none of the prospective
jurors recognized him at the onset of the trial.

(T. 11)

The prejudicial impact on a jury of the prior misdeeds
of a criminal defendant has long been recognized by the courts,
particularly where the prior conviction is similar to the crime
charged.

Recognizing this danger, the trial court took some

measures to prevent the jury from finding out who the appellant
was:

All witnesses were to be admonished not to refer to the

appellant's prior convictions, they were not to refer to the
Sugarhouse area by that name (T. 4), and the news media were
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ordered not to refer to the appellant's prior record or to refer
to him as the "Sugarhouse Rapist" (To 91-92).

The reasons for

these orders was stated by the court:
I am going to ask both counsel to admonish all
witnesses that they make no reference to any prior
rapes or convictions of any kinde To try this
case strictly on the facts of this particular casee
(T.

4)

*

*

*

I am going to do this, because I think it would
be highly prejudicial to ref er to him in any news
report as the "Sugarhouse Rapist"; I am going to
issue an order that none of the news media is to
use the term "Sugarhouse Rapist" during the course
of the trial, because I think it is highly prejudicial.
(T. 91)
Although the trial court intelligently foresaw the explosive
potential of prejudice to the appellant, should they jury learn
that he was the notorious "Sugarhouse Rapist", the court's solution
to the problem was less than adequate.

Instead of simply

sequesterin~

the jury during the trial (at least after it became apparent
that the media were covering and reporting on the trial) as
moved by counsel, the court chose to issue a gag order to the
media.

The gag order was improper for two reasons.

First,

it constituted a prior restraint on the media's First Amendment
Freedom of Speech and Press rights, which restraint would have
been unnecessary if the jury were sequestered.

Second, the

gag order did not adequately assure the appellant of a fair
trial, for it left the jury at large during the times court
was not in session, where they very likely were exposed to the
media reports.

-16-
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If one or more of the jurors had read or heard the prior
news reports referring to the appellant as the "Sugarhouse Rapist",
and then heard the news reports during his trial mentioning
that some facts about the accused were not being disclosed due
to a court order, they may easily have caught the connection,
and been reminded of the prior news reports concerning the "Sugarhouse
Rapist"o

Indeed, the very mention of a court order prohibiting

disclosure of facts about an accused which are already of public
record fairly screams the message that someone has something
to hide.

Such a report, coupled with the reports at the time

of the arrest and preliminary hearing which did call the appellant
the "Sugarhouse Rapist", could certainly tip off an interested
listener as to who this defendant really was.
As to whether this actually happened in the present case,
the appellant has no way of knowing.

Such a risk of prejudice

could have been avoided, had the trial court either sequestered
the jurors, or at least asked them the simple question of whether
or not they had been exposed to any on-going publicity concerning
the trial.
CONCLUSION
The circuit court was without authority to grant the
State's discovery motion compelling the appellant to submit
to blood and hair samples.
I

The samples were therefore taken

without a valid court order or warrant, and the blood sample
was taken in violation of the appellant's Fourth Amendment rights,
and should have been suppressed by the trial court.

The trial
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court further connnitted prejudicial error in refusing to either
sequester the jury or at least poll the jurors as to their possible
exposure to the publicity surrounding the trial.

The conviction

should be reversed, and the case remanded to the Third District
Court for a new trial.
DATED this

·/

day of December, 1982.

•.-· LYNN R . BROWN
'
-·- Attorney for Appellant

'

~ ; I

'.;'

.

\

I ' ,·; l
'·'-'"':....11'-

'

I....

---Z,

'

L ,_ --~'-

J. MARK ANDRUS
A_,ttorney for Appellant

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
day of December, 1982.
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